Rethinking the Ontology of History: From Things of the Past to the Quantum Nature of Historical Phenomena 

What does history have to do with physics? Or matter with theory of history?

How strongly have scientific models of the material and physical world informed how scholars understand history?

To what extent can contemporary models of physical reality, such as quantum mechanics, help us to rethink our concept of historical reality?

These questions are the point of departure for the research programme Towards a Material-Oriented Theory of History. The programme rests on three core assumptions: Firstly, all historical research is built on largely tacit ontological assumptions about the nature—the mode of being or non-being—of history, postulated as an ensemble of past events and occurrences. Secondly, ontological understandings of the nature of history have always been shaped by perceptions of the material and physical world, and their attendant theories, ranging from natural philosophy to modern physics. Thirdly, these ontological assumptions have a serious impact on the epistemology of history and how we go about constructing our object of knowledge. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the programme posits that the key problems facing historical knowledge and the threatening persistence of scepticism stem directly from this ontological model.

But what does it mean that ontological understandings of the nature of history have been shaped over time by perceptions of the material and physical world, and their attendant theories?

Historical scholarship has traditionally seen the past as an ensemble of accomplished “things” (res gestae) and historiography as the representation of these “things” (historia rerum gestarum), based on various materials—sources and remnants. Facts, events and sources in this understanding are considered discrete entities, separate physical bodies or even atoms, to be observed as external reality connected by causal links (nexus rerum) or narrative emplotment.

Speaking about the modes of being and not-being of history, however, is more complicated than speaking about physical reality. The presumed object of historical inquiry—the past—no longer exists and cannot therefore be observed directly. The discipline of history is based on investigation of traces, clues and sources that have survived from the past, and on narratives passed down to us. Consequently, historical knowledge is indirect knowledge gleaned from mediated testimonies. In this sense, historians often lament the fragmentary nature of the available sources or the absence of archival records. In doing so, however, they reproduce the belief that their object of study is the past as it actually occurred, conceived as a collection of discrete and completed events, deeds or occurrences.

This way of thinking has not been seriously challenged since the emergence of perspectivism in the eighteenth century. The core idea of historical perspectivism is twofold. It holds, on the one hand, that historical inquiry is consistently conditioned and constrained by factors beyond the historian’s control, such as the systems of belief, methods and values in which they themselves are embedded, their limited resources (knowledge, time and funding), and fragmentary, arbitrary or nonexistent evidence (the ‘silence’ of the archive). Conversely, perspectivism argues that historians, situated as they are in the present, shape the questions they ask of the past—implicitly or explicitly—through the lens of concerns and urgencies of their own era. Yet perspectivism is not as radical as it appears.¹ This position, too, continues to reaffirm the correspondence theory of truth, namely the idea that a referent external to historical inquiry exists—be it the past itself or source material—against which the validity of interpretations can be assessed, or, as historians increasingly phrase it, against which their degree of plausibility can be measured.

The problem with this ontological model is that history continues to base its scientific validity on “things” of the past, on discrete and completed events. Yet the primary object of historical inquiry is not the elementary fact that “on the night of August 4, 1914, German troops crossed the frontier of Belgium”—to pick up an example from Hannah Arendt.² Rather, this event is defined by the (causal) nexuses that connect it to other occurrences across time, as well as to synchronous circumstances in space. Precisely because of their synthetic nature—at once selective and condensing—causal nexuses and structures of meaning have no referent in the world, neither past nor present. Thus, the atomistic or physico-ontological conception of history as a collection of disjunct events separated by an invisible gap to be “filled” by meaningful argumentative connections has left behind a series of epistemological problems that remain unresolved to this day. The in-between of discrete events and the connections that link them remain elusive and inaccessible to direct sensory observation; both frequently lack a referent of any kind. 

From Things of the Past to the Quantum Ontology of Historical Phenomena

In light of these considerations, one might be tempted to conclude that the problem of an empty in-between and the linkage dilemma both stem from the physical and material model of its ontology, and that simply abandoning that matrix would solve the epistemological issues. This is not the path I intend to pursue. Rejecting the physico-material model of history does not mean relinquishing the idea that physics—and reflection on matter more broadly—can serve as a whetstone for thinking about the “reality” of historical phenomena (and vice versa). Historical theory can use this dialogue to rethink the ontological and epistemological status of its object of inquiry and develop a conception of the historical phenomenon that is neither fabulation (constructivism) nor reduction to the real and completed facts of the past (substantialism). In my view, the challenge is instead to rethink the onto-epistemological conception of the modes of existence of the object of inquiry.  

My central claim is that historical phenomena are actual only in the moment of interaction and interconnection between historians, remains, sources and other factors involved in historical inquiry. What if historians began to apply the word “happens” to the process of research instead of to a state of affairs in the past?³ What if the research process itself were accorded the status of historical reality?   

Recent debates in the philosophy of science and physics—including those surrounding new materialism, space–time–mattering models, relational quantum mechanics, and quantum philosophy—have highlighted precisely these relational dimensions and invite us to rethink the ontological status of reality and of matter as objects of inquiry.

A key project approach is to view historical phenomena as emerging materially and relationally in the course of processes of knowledge production, rather than as fixed, external entities endowed with autonomous reality and inherent properties – following, among others, Karin Knorr-Cetina’s “phenomenal field,”⁴ Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s “epistemic things,”⁵ and Karen Barad’s “intra-actions.”⁶

Karen Barad’s work, in particular, demonstrates that epistemic practices cannot be understood merely as scientific concerns but are inherently ethical and political. In their work, Barad replaces the concept of interaction, which presupposes pre-existing entities entering into relations, with that of intra-action. Building on Niels Bohr’s principle of indeterminacy, as distinct from Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty, Barad argues that “the values of complementary variables (such as position and momentum) are not simultaneously determinate. The issue is not one of unknowability per se; rather, it is a question of what can be said to simultaneously exist.”⁷ Accordingly, the investigation of complementary phenomena demands mutually exclusive experimental arrangements.

Against the atomistic metaphysics according to which the world is composed of discrete entities endowed with independently attributable properties, Barad insists that phenomena are produced within material-discursive practices. Apparatuses are therefore not passive instruments of observation; on the contrary, they actively produce phenomena and are themselves part of them. They are understood as boundary-making practices, as specific “material reconfigurings” of the world. Barad’s agential onto-epistemology “does not take the boundaries of any of the objects or subjects of these studies for granted but rather investigates the material-discursive boundary-making practices that produce ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’ and other differences out of, and in terms of, a changing relationality.”⁸ In this sense, the well-known example of the double-slit experiment, among others Barad refers to in their work, is paradigmatic not because it demonstrates the indeterminacy of a phenomenon that may appear as a wave or a particle, but because it shows how the experimental arrangement enacts a cut between the object and the agencies of observation, and how different intra-actions produce different phenomena. Hence, the core of Barad’s analysis is not the ontological reality of matter, but the reality of material-discursive boundary-making practices as reality-making practices. Barad concludes that “an unambiguous account of proper quantum phenomena must, in principle, include a description of all relevant features of the experimental arrangement.”⁹

To what extent can these theories help to unsettle our conventional assumptions in the philosophy or theory of history and reconceptualize the ontological status of historical phenomena?

Challenged by these philosophers and physicists—and, above all, given recent reflections on matter and realism—I suggest that we understand the historical phenomenon as lacking an autonomous reality with fixed attributes in the past. By analogy with agential realism, I see it instead as a phenomenon emerging through intra-action between remains, sources, infrastructures, methods, discourses, and research agents embodied in different communities, as well as modes of interpretation and representation. The appeal here is that such relational, physico-material theories come up with an anti-essentialist mode of thinking about the things of the past, while simultaneously affirming the reality of their intra-actions with present-day research apparatuses. This perspective could prompt a rethinking of the concept of reality in history, countering both historical scepticism and radical constructivism in the process, without lapsing into new forms of substantialism. The historical phenomenon is not the result of connecting selected past occurrences; rather, it emerges performatively from the entirety of research practices.

What would historical research and historiography look like if historical materials were no longer considered discrete, stable and combinable entities, but unstable, “vibrant” matter¹⁰ that emerges as a phenomenon in the process of inquiry and the course of intra-action with the instruments of knowledge? What, in this sense, would constitute an adequate presentation of the historical phenomenon? More specifically, what forms of narration are capable of foregrounding the intra-activity of the research process, rather than reproducing a continuum of events? One possible mode is what I call the “exploratory account,”¹¹ whereby the research process itself becomes the subject of historical narration.

Exploring matter-history-interfaces

Reflection on how historical phenomena emerge in the course of research cannot remain confined to the purely speculative level. The Theory-Oriented Object Collection (TOOC), a research collection comprising both historical artefacts and everyday objects, aims to offer a series of material whetstones that provoke questions and generate new insights into historico-theoretical problems. The objects and materials in the collection are not merely illustrations of theoretical arguments; rather, they function as catalysts for theory formation and as active participants in theoretical inquiry. A series of pilot studies has explored the heuristic potential of this approach through selected “liminal objects” or “objects of doubt”¹² drawn from the TOOC. These studies are grounded in a mode of inquiry that reconceptualizes objects not as stable, discrete entities, but as processual phenomena, thereby advancing a revised understanding of both materiality and the research object itself. Within this framework, for example, a pebble collected on a seashore (fig. 1) acquires a hybrid ontological status when the chemical composition of its surface is analysed. The object was initially examined by Boaz Paz at PAZ Laboratories for Archaeometry. Its perfectly rounded shape immediately raises the question of ‘authorship’: is the form of the pebble a result of the mechanical action of sea waves or is it a human-made artefact? According to a high-resolution 3D microscope analysis, which excluded the presence of anthropogenic tool marks on its surface, the pebble is a fundamental fact of nature (fig. 2–4). Focusing more specifically on the material composition of the stone, however, Paz discovered bitumen components on its surface. These could be anthropogenic contaminants such as coal tar or asphalt. Thus, the surface ceases to function as a boundary separating the limestone from its environment and instead reveals itself as a zone of absorption of exogenous elements: iron and organic admixtures, as well as anthropogenic pollutants (e.g., tar-like impurities or human-produced elements such as plutonium).¹³ Its surface raises the question of the pebble’s ambivalent nature: it is neither a purely natural fact nor a mere artefact, but rather a co-produced entity shaped by the interplay of natural processes and (unintentional) human activity. The surface emerges as an interface—a zone of potential realities that is inherently unstable both ontologically and conceptually, since its constitution depends on the interaction of observational apparatuses, material agencies, research methods, and the questions posed. Depending on the conceptual and apparatus-based configuration of the analysis, the pebble becomes a paradoxical object: it appears either as an artefact or as a natural object, while simultaneously being irreducibly both.

Another case study takes as its point of departure a cardboard box containing various items of militaria, including a ration can (fig. 5). The study focuses particularly on the material interfaces that developed between a 1940 military field ration in a tin-plated iron can and the cardboard box in which it was stored for decades¹⁴ The contents of the can leaked and interacted with the substances with which it came into contact, including the box and the cardboard’s bleaching agents (fig. 6–7). The hybrid material produced through contamination at the level of these interfaces establishes a connection between natural history and human history. The edible matter, originally processed by humans and preserved in the tin as an energy reserve for soldiers, subsequently undergoes processes of reorganization. By virtue of its own activity, endowed with a certain purposiveness, matter enters a phase of remineralization that runs counter to the ration’s original alimentary function, thereby contributing to its de-historicization.

As in other case studies, the non-object under consideration consists in this intermediate material region of inherently ambivalent character, which can neither be fully assigned to the domain of history—understood as the sphere of meaningful (intentional) human action—nor to a natural temporality operating independently of human agency to reassert its own order. Such materialities, in combination with other liminal objects within the TOOC (such as textile stains, sherds, slags, and 3D digifacts) prompt a reconsideration of the very concept of history: and where, ultimately, do the boundaries of the historical discipline lie?

The research programme Towards a Material-Oriented History is conceived as a space for exploration and exchange, where liminal encounters with the natural and material sciences are possible and the very concept of history is open to critical renegotiation.

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Lisa Regazzoni is Professor of Theory of History and Director of the Center for Theories in Historical Research at Bielefeld University. Among her numerous international fellowships are research stays at Centre Alexandre Koyré and EHESS in Paris, the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and Harvard University. She is co-editor of the blog Theory of History at Work and author of: Selection and Catalogue. The Construction of the Past by Homer, Dante and Primo Levi (published in German in 2008 and in Italian in 2010), Pasts Without Writing. Historical Writing at Its Limits, (published in German in 2019) and The Episteme of the Gallic Past. French Historical Research in the 18th and Early 19th Century (2024). She is working on her next book, tentatively entitled The Physicality of History: The Elementary Particles of the Past and the Invisible In-Betweenness.

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1. See Ethan Kleinberg, A New Compass of History (for the End-time of Truth). Ed. Lisa Regazzoni, with comments by Berber Bevernage, Kristin Platt, und Lisa Regazzoni. Bielefeld: Bielefeld University Press, 2025 (Bielefeld Theory Talks 1). [↩]
2. Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” The New Yorker. February 18, 1967. [↩]
3. Here I paraphrase a passage from Werner Heisenberg’s “The Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Theory” (1959) in id., Physics and Philosophy. London: Penguin, 1989, 22: “If we want to describe what happens in an atomic event, we have to realize that the word ‘happens’ can apply only to the observation, not to the state of affairs between two observations.” [↩]
4. Karin Knorr-Cetina, Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. [↩]
5. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Experimentalsysteme und epistemische Dinge: eine Geschichte der Proteinsynthese im Reagenzglas. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002. [↩]
6. Karen Barad, “Agential Realism: How Material-Discursive Practices Matter,” Signs28, no. 3 (2003): 803-31; and id., Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2007. [↩]
7. Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 118. [↩]
8. Ibid., 93. [↩]
9. Ibid., 119. [↩]
10. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A political Ecology of Things. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010. [↩]
11. Lisa Regazzoni. (13 May 2025). “Das ‚Dazwischen‘ als ontologisches Problem in der Geschichtswissenschaft: Ein alternativer Vorschlag – out of the Box.” [The “In-Between” as an Ontological Problem in Historiography: An Alternative Proposal – Out of the Box]. Geschichtstheorie am Werk: https://doi.org/10.58079/13wvj [↩]
12. Lisa Regazzoni, “The Uncertain Stuff of History: Outline of a Theory of Intentionality – Thing by Thing,” History and Theory 63, no. 2 (2024): 186-218. https://doi.org/10.1111/hith.12341 [↩]
13. See Jan Zalasiewicz, The Planet in a Pebble: A Journey into Earth’s Deep History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Regazzoni, “The Uncertain Stuff of History.” [↩]
14. Regazzoni, “Das ‘Dazwischen’ als ontologisches Problem in der Geschichtswissenschaft.” [↩]

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